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2.1  Introduction 
The behavior of single-family home prices in the United States has become 
a topic of increasing interest during the past two decades. Prior to 1970, house 
prices moved  slowly at about the rate of  inflation or slightly below,  and re- 
gional differences, while they existed, were relatively modest by current stan- 
dards. During the 1970s, however, house prices nationwide grew significantly 
faster than the rate of inflation, and homeowners earned tax-sheltered imputed 
rents and tax-sheltered capital gains on their leveraged assets, producing dra- 
matic rates of return and low user costs throughout the decade. The decade 
of the 1980s produced much lower returns overall, but brought with it sharp 
differences in price behavior across regions and significantly increased vola- 
tility. 
This paper reviews the behavior of house prices in the United States. First, 
the paper takes a national perspective, piecing together a description of what 
we know about house prices since 1950 but focusing on the past two decades. 
Second, it describes differences in price behavior across regions of the country, 
especially since the first California boom between 1976 and 1980. Third, it 
reviews what we know and do not know about the causes of house price move- 
ments. A final section looks at the impact of increasing regional disparities on 
mobility and regional growth. 
Karl E. Case is professor of economics at Wellesley College and a visiting scholar at the Federal 
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Sources: 1947-87  Data Resources, database (Lexington, Mass.: McGraw-Hill, U.S.  Prices Duru 
Bunk; US.  Department of Commerce, 1988-90 Survey of  Currenr Business (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, August 1990-May  1991). 
House prices, 1947-90.  Residential investment component of GNP 
2.2  Housing Prices since 1950: National Trends 
The most significant problem in studying the movement of home prices is 
the lack of consistent data. The two most commonly cited time series used as 
proxies for home appreciation are the residential investment component of the 
GNP deflator (see Mankiw and Weil [1989], Hendershott and Hu  [1981], and 
others), and the census's Constant Quality Home Price Index (see Apgar et al. 
[1990], Hendershott and Hu  [1981], and others), which is available only since 
1963. While neither is ideal, they are as good as any available national data 
series on prices prior to 1970.' Since 1970, Case and Shiller (1988) have con- 
structed very precise appreciation indices for four cities, but the national data 
are still weak. 
Figure 2.1 shows the pattern of real home prices since 1947 as represented 
by the residential investment component of the GNP deflator. According to the 
index, prices dropped from a peak in 1952 to a low in 1966, and then rose until 
the early 1980s. Table 2.1 looks at the change in the index by decade, relative 
to two measures of income and construction costs. 
Between 1950 and 1960, house prices dropped an average of 0.78 percent 
per year in real terms, while real per capita income rose 1.90 percent per year 
1. The possible exception is a series from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, which is avail- 
able since 1960 and is discussed below. Home Loan Bank officials have cautioned against relying 
on those numbers. 31  Land Prices and House Prices in the United States 
and real median family income rose even faster at 3.2 percent. A similar pat- 
tern, with rapid income growth and slightly declining real home prices, recurs 
in the 1960s. During the 1970s, however, the pattern reverses itself. Income 
growth in the 1970s, particularly family income, dropped sharply while house 
prices rose more rapidly. 
Rising house prices, of course, make homeowners better off, as their equity 
grows. On the other hand, when house prices outpace income, housing be- 
comes less affordable to those who do not own. Thus, during the 1950s and 
1960s, the return on owning a house was low, but housing became more af- 
fordable. During the 1970s, rates of return to owners were dramatic, but hous- 
ing became less affordable. 
This pattern is borne out by  the census figures presented in table 2.2. The 
table gives the ratio of median reported house price to median household in- 
come in five metropolitan areas for census years 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980. 
In all five cities, the ratio drops significantly from 1950 to 1960 and from 1960 
to 1970. The ratio rises during the 1970s. 
Both Hendershott and Hu (1981) and Case and Shiller (1990) calculate ex- 
cess rates of return to home ownership for different periods between 1950 and 
1989. While the return measures in the two papers are slightly different, both 
include estimates of imputed rent, capital gains, property taxes, maintenance, 
and  depreciation and  include changes in  tax  treatment and  interest rates. 
Hendershott and Hu find returns of about -6.5  percent for most owners and 
-  14.5 percent for more leveraged owners in upper-income brackets during the 
1956-63 period. Both papers find very high excess returns during the 1970s. 
Apgar et al. (1990) construct a data set that shows the impact of changing 
Table 2.1  House Prices, Construction Costs, and Income, 1950-88 (average real 
annual percentage increase) 
House  House  Median 
Price  Price  Construction  Per Capita  Family 
(Series I)”  (Series 2)h  Cost‘  GNPd  Income‘ 
1950-60  -  -0.78  +0.56  + 1.90  +3.20 
1960-70  0.0  -0.33  +1.33  +3.10  +2.96 
1970-80  +2.77  +1.66  +0.74  +1.33  +0.03 
1980-88  -0.31  -0.74  -0.13  +  1.65  +0.81 
“U.S.  Bureau of  the Census,  Constant Quality Home Price Index, Construction Reports, series 
C-27 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), since 1963 only. 
bResidential investment component of the GNP deflator relative to the GNP deflator. Data Re- 
sources, database (Lexington, Mass.: McGraw-Hill). See figure 2.1. 
‘E. H. Boeckh Construction Cost Index, small residential structures, composite; U.S. Bureau of 
the Census, Historical Statistics of  the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, series N-121 (Wash- 
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), U.S.  Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract ofthe 
United States, 1990 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office). 
dHistorical Statistics, series F-2, 224; Statistical Abstract, 1990. 
‘Historical Statistics, series G-179,296; Statistical Abstract, 1990. 32  Karl E. Case 
Table 2.2  Family Income and  House Prices: Selected Cities, 1950-80 
Pricefincome Ratio 
1950  1960  1970  1980 
New York  3.02  2.30  2.04  3.40 
Boston  3.02  2.19  1 .so  2.57 
Los Angeles  2.68  2.12  1.94  4.16 
Chicago  2.95  2.35  1.81  2.68 
Dallas  2.17  1.69  1.50  2.15 
Source: US.  Bureau of the Census, Housing Characteristics of the Population (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980). Figures are the ratio of  median reported 
home value to median household income. 
prices on both owners and potential owners between 1967 and 1989. Table 2.3 
reproduces a table from the Apgar study.  The house price variable is con- 
structed using the census constant quality index applied to the 1977 median 
value of house purchased by a first-time buyer. The table shows that unantici- 
pated inflation in house prices reduced the total burden of owning for a first- 
time buyer to less than 10 percent of income in the late 1970s, while the cash 
burden climbed to 40 percent of income in 1980. The early 1980s saw dramatic 
increases in  interest rates and  much  slower appreciation. The combination 
pushed up cash costs to a high of 44.5 percent of income and the total burden 
to a high of 37.2 percent of income in 1982. 
2.2.1 
While nationally  house prices  lagged inflation in the  1950s, 1960s, and 
1980s and rose more rapidly than prices in general during the 1970s, there 
were marked differences across regions. To  illustrate these differences, this 
section presents data on four metropolitan areas between 1970 and 1986. The 
data presented are from Case and Shiller (1987). They constructed weighted 
repeat sales (WRS) indices of appreciation based on forty thousand multiple 
sales of  the same property drawn from a large sample of  sales in the four 
cities.2  Tables 2.4 and 2.5 summarize the data. 
While substantial variance in performance can be seen across the four cities, 
all saw house prices at least keep pace with inflation as measured by the CPI. 
In Atlanta and Chicago, existing house prices remained remarkably constant 
in real terms over the sixty-five quarters of the sample period. While nominal 
prices nearly tripled, so did consumer prices in general. Real increases in At- 
lanta and Chicago averaged less than 1 percent per year. 
The increases recorded in Dallas and San Francisco stand in marked con- 
Regional Differences in Price Behavior 
2.  The Case and Shiller methodology is very  similar to one proposed by  Bailey, Muth, and 
Norse (1963). The raw data are from Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, and San Francisco. The San Fran- 
cisco data are from Alameda County. Table 2.3  Income and Housing Costs, U.S. Totals, 1967-89  (1989 dollars) 
Cost as % of 
Income, First- 
First-  Owner Costs  Time Buyers 
Time 
Buyer’s  House  Mortgage  Mortgage  Other  Before-  Tax  After-  Expected  Total  Cash  Total 
Year  Income  Price  Rate (%)  Payment  Costs  TaxCash  Savings  TaxCash  Appreciation  Cost  Burden  Burden 
1967  27,016 
1968  27,134 
1969  26,816 
1970  28,241 
1971  28,213 
1972  28,764 
1973  27,860 
1974  28,142 
1975  26,885 
1976  26,025 
1977  25,828 
1978  26,187 
1979  25,211 
1980  24,313 
1981  24,112 
1982  23,626 
1983  24,130 
1984  24,582 

































































































317  5,735 
396  5,913 
508  6,195 
586  6,270 
410  6,318 
424  6,473 
385  6,764 
444  7.07 1 
520  7,20  1 
558  7,291 
160  8,023 
394  8,433 
592  9,078 
92  1  9,757 
1,233  10,497 
1,138  10,510 
887  9,389 
853  9,3  12 







































21.2  17.3 
21.8  16.0 
23.1  14.4 
22.2  16.2 
22.4  15.3 
22.5  14.2 
24.3  13.1 
25.1  12.5 
26.8  10.4 
28.0  11.3 
31.1  10.2 
32.2  7.9 
36.0  7.9 
40.1  16.1 
43.5  27.0 
44.5  37.2 
38.9  35.9 
37.9  35.5 
35.8  33.5 Table 2.3  (continued) 
Cost as % of 
Income, First- 
First-  Owner Costs  Time Buyers 
Time 
Buyer’s  House  Mortgage  Mortgage  Other  Before-  Tax  After-  Expected  Total  Cash  Total 
Year  Income  Price  Rate (%)  Payment  Costs  Tax Cash  Savings  Tax Cash  Appreciation  Cost  Burden  Burden 
1986  25,212  72,117  9.80  5,974  3,046  9,019  630  8,389  2,564  6,921  33.3  27.5 
1987  24,978  73,715  8.94  5,664  2,976  8,639  445  8,194  3,340  6,003  32.8  24.0 
1988  25,783  73,386  9.01  5,674  2,932  8,606  253  8,352  3,106  6,499  32.4  25.2 
1989  26,000  72,628  9.81  6,021  2,900  8,921  322  8,599  2,750  7,208  33.1  27.7 
~  ~~ 
Source: Apgar et al. 1990. 
Notes: Annual income of families and primary individuals: 1970 from the 1970 Census of  the Population;  1967 to 1969 from the Panel  Survey of  Income 
Llynamics; 1971 and 1972 interpolated from the Panel  Survey of  Income Dynamics  and 1970 Census of  the Population; 1973 to 1983 from the American 
Housing Survey; 1983 to 1989 from the American Housing Survey adjusted by the Current Population Survey. “First-time buyers” defined as married-couple 
renters aged 25 to 29. All dollar amounts expressed in 1989 constant dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics consumer price index (CPI-UX) for all items. 
CPI-UX deflator slightly revised from that used in previous State of  the Nation$ Housing Reports. 
House price is American Housing Survey median value of house purchased by first-time home buyers aged 25 to 29 in 1977, indexed by U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Constant Quality Home Price Index; Construction Reports, series C-27, which was recently revised to incorporate improved methodology for estimat- 
ing the price of a home of constant quality; hence the index differs somewhat from that used in previous State of  the Narionk Housing Reporrs. Mortgage rates 
equal Federal Home Loan Bank Board contract mortgage rate. Mortgage payments assume a thirty-year mortgage with 20 percent down. Other costs include 
property tax, insurance, fuel and utilities, and maintenance. After-tax cash cost equals mortage payment plus other costs, less tax savings of home ownership. 
Tax savings is based on the excess of housing (mortgage interest and real estate taxes) plus nonhousing deductions over the standard deduction. Nonhousing 
deductions are set at 5 percent of income through  1986. With tax reform, they decrease to 4.25 percent in 1987 and 3.5  percent from 1988 on. Total cost 
equals after-tax cash cost plus opportunity cost of down payment, amortization of  fees, and closing costs, less expected equity buildup. Expected equity 
buildup is estimated as a weighted average of increases in house prices in the previous three years. (Weights are one-half for the previous year, one-third for 
the second year, and one-sixth for the third year.) American Housing Survey data indexed by Bureau of Labor Statistics consumer price indices for various 
components of housing cost. 35  Land Prices and House Prices in the United States 
Table 2.4  Changes in Prices of Existing Single-Family  Homes Computed Using 
the WRS Method (%) 
Nominal Change  Real Change 
Average  Average 
Total  Annual Rate  Total  Annual Rate 








































































"All items. all urban consumers. 
Table 2.5  Changes in WRS Indices and Changes in Median Prices of Existing Single- 
Family Homes in Four Cities, 1981-86 





Total  Rate 
Weighted Repeat  National Assn. 
Sales  Real  tors 
Average  Average 
Annual  Annual 





Total  Rate 
Atlanta"  +44.6  +8.5  +28.2  +5.7  +17.7  +3.7  +4.5  +1.0 
Chicagob  +19.3  +3.4  +19.8  +3.4  -4.0  -0.8  -3.4  -0.7 
Dallasb  +48.4  +7.8  +31.0  +5.3  +19.1  +3.4  +5.6  +1.0 
SanFrancisco'  +45.4  +7.0  +25.8  +4.3  +16.2  +2.8  +0.9  f0.2 
CPI-u*  +25.1  +4.1 
"1981:l to 1985:3. 
b1981:1 to 1986:2. 
'1981:l to 1986:3. 
dAll items. all consumers. 36  Karl E. Case 
trast. Property values in Dallas rose an average of  2.2 percentage points per 
year faster than the CPI, while real increases in San Francisco averaged 4.3 
percent per year.  Such high and sustained real appreciation rates are remark- 
able. Real house prices in Dallas increased by nearly 43 percent. In San Fran- 
cisco, they nearly doubled. 
The second and third parts of table 2.4 look at two shorter periods of time. 
The first corresponds to the inflationhecession cycle of  1971-75.  The second 
runs from the bottom of the 1974-75  recession to the period of very high inter- 
est rates in early 1981. 
Between 1970 and 1975, house price increases were modest and fairly uni- 
form. In all four cities, price increases totaled between 39 and 54 percent over 
the five years, while prices in general rose 38 percent. San Francisco led the 
pack with real increases of 2.2 percent per year. 
The period from 1975:l to 1981:l shows anything but uniform house price 
increases across the cities. The first California boom (to be discussed below) 
is evident. Over the six years, annual appreciation of homes in the San Fran- 
cisco sample averaged 9.4 percent in real terms. Meanwhile, real prices in 
Atlanta dropped nearly 7 percent for an average decline of  1.1 percent per year. 
While house prices in Chicago increased at about the same rate as consumer 
prices in general, Dallas was experiencing a miniboom of its own. Homes in 
Dallas appreciated 34.2 percent, or  an average of 5.0 percent in real terms. 
Between 1981 and 1986, relative calm returned to all four of these markets, 
although other parts of the country, particularly the Northeast, boomed. Table 
2.5 presents the National Association of Realtors (NAR) median price of an 
existing single-family home and WRS indices for the period. In no case did 
the real WRS index grow more than 1 percent per year. In Chicago, it fell 0.7 
percent per year. 
The same pattern is reflected in excess returns estimated in Case and Shiller 
(1990). Table 2.6 presents a summary of the nonleveraged excess returns esti- 
mated for the same three periods since 1970. Once again performance is fairly 
similar across the cities during the first half of the 1970s, while Dallas and San 
Francisco moved sharply ahead during the last half. The 1980s brought nega- 
tive excess returns to Chicago and San Francisco, while Atlanta and Dallas had 
small positive excess returns. 
Table 2.6  Excess Returns to Investment in Single-Family  Owner-Occupied 
Housing, 19706  (%) 
City  1971  :  1-1975: 1  1975:  1-1981: 1  1981:  1-1986~2 
Atlanta  1.7  4.0  0.5 
Chicago  5.6  6.0  -4.2 
Dallas  7.5  11.9  1.5 
San Francisco  9.2  15.1  -  1.7 
Source: Case and Shiller (1990). 37  Land Prices and  House Prices in the United States 










Total Nominal  Average Annual  Average 
Change in  Nominal  Annual 
Period  Median  Change  Real Change 
1976-80  106.9  19.9  9.3 
1983-87  114.5  21.0  17.7 
1983-87  108.4  20.2  16.9 
1986-88  30.4  14.2  10.2 
1987-89  53.2  23.8  19.1 
1987-90  101.6  26.3  21.2 
1988-90  63.3  27.7  22.3 
Sources: National Association of Realtors, Home Sales (Washington, D.C.: NAR), monthly; CPI, 
Data Resources, database (Lexington, Mass.: McGraw-Hill). 
*Figures based on San Francisco mean price. Unpublished data from the NAR. 
bBased on figures for San Francisco,  although  similar  price  increases  were recorded  in  Los 
Angeles and Orange Country. 
2.2.2  Increased Volatility: The Booms 
Perhaps the most important phenomenon in recent years has been the in- 
creased volatility evident in several cities. Table 2.7 describes seven booms 
that have  occurred since the late  1970s. While the first California boom of 
1976-80  was  a dramatic event, in real terms it was just a hint of  what was 
to follow. 
The Boston and New York booms were similar to each other in magnitude, 
with real prices rising at 18 percent and 17 percent, respectively, over a four- 
year period. At peak in both cities, prices were rising at nearly 40 percent per 
year (see Case [1986] for the Boston pattern over the period based on repeat 
sales). 
The second California boom was shorter lived, but perhaps more dramatic 
near the peak. The Wall Street Journal carried a front-page article on June 1, 
1988, with the headline “Buyers’ Panic Sweeps California’s Big Market in 
One-Family Homes.” Realtors reported multiple offers and prices rising at 4 
percent per month, or over 50 percent per year, at the peak. 
The most recent booms have been in Honolulu and Seattle. In Honolulu, the 
median price jumped from $186,000 in 1987 to $375,000 in the third quarter 
of  1990. In Seattle, the median was up from $88,700 in 1988 to $144,800 in 
the third quarter of  1990. 
The downside of  a boom is a bust. While booms have been dramatic and 
frequent, prices appear to be less volatile on the downside. The most dramatic 
decline in the NAR median home price was a 28.5 percent real drop recorded 
between 1985 and  1988 in the Houston metropolitan area. Since 1988, the 
median price in Boston has dropped 12 percent in real terms. The declines 38  Karl E. Case 
Table 2.8  Median Price of Existing Single-Family Homes, 1982 and 1989 
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Source; National Association of Realtors, Home Sales Yearbook: 1989 (Washington, D.C.: NAR). 
Cities are the largest US. metropolitan areas (by population) for which the NAR has data back 
to 1982. 
currently in Boston and New York appear from anecdotal evidence to be sig- 
nificantly greater than the declines in the median would suggest. Some areas 
have seen nominal declines of up to 25 percent. Nonetheless, there appears to 
be significant sticluness and resistance to sharp downward movements even 
where fundamental factors would suggest a collapse. 
2.3  Regional Differences in House Price Levels 
Differences in price performance  across regions  and increased volatility 
have led to differences in price levels across regions that are substantial and 
larger than they were in earlier years. Table 2.8 presents the median price of 
existing single-family homes in 1982 and 1989 in the largest sixteen U.S. met- 
ropolitan areas for which the data are available from the NAR. In  1982, the 
highest-priced city (San Francisco) had a median price that was 2.6 times the 
median price in the lowest-priced city (Detroit). In 1989, the highest city was 
3.9 times higher than the lowest. Table 2.8 shows that the coefficient of varia- 
tion across these sixteen cities grew from .277 in 1982 to .475 in 1989. 
The only consistent series of metropolitan area-specific  median home prices 
for years prior to 1981 is the Mortgage Interest Rate Survey, conducted annu- 
ally since 1963 by the Federal Home Loan Bank  The survey is con- 
3. See Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Office of Thrift Supervision, “Rates and Terms on 
Conventional Home Mortgages, Annual Summary, 1989” (Washington, D.C.: Government Print- 39  Land Prices and  House Prices in the United States 
ducted in thirty-two metropolitan areas. Based on this larger sample of cities, 
a coefficient of  dispersion (CD) was calculated for each year between  1973 
and 1989. While the level of the coefficient is lower in the larger sample, the 
pattern is the same. The CD stood at .164 in  1973, rising slowly to .188 by 
1979. From 1979 to 1983, it jumped sharply from .188 to .245 and continued 
to climb to .272 by  1989. 
Looking at similar homes in specific areas of the country reveals dramatic 
differences that cannot be seen in the aggregate data. For example, a three- 
bedroom, one-and-a-half-bath home on ten thousand square feet of land in a 
good neighborhood is currently worth $120,000 in a number of Midwest cities, 
$240,000 in the Northeast, and as much as $700,000 in parts of California. 
While a great deal of  attention has been paid to house prices in the United 
States, economists have  devoted very little time to the study of  land prices. 
In  fact, there are virtually no generally available data on land prices in the 
United States. 
It’s  not clear why this is so. Part of the reason is that most land is sold in 
combination with capital, and the task of separating the land from the capital 
value is difficult. Since nearly all property taxes in the United States are levied 
on the combined value of land and capital, there is no compelling reason for 
tax administrators to undertake to disentangle the two. Nonetheless, it remains 
a puzzle why so little academic attention has been focused on land prices. 
It is a virtual certainty that the increase in volatility across regions is the 
result of differentials in land values. There is evidence that construction costs 
explain only a small fraction of the price increases recorded in several of the 
boom areas!  Table 2.1 shows that only a small part of  the increase in house 
prices nationally between  1970 and 1980 was due to increased construction 
costs. 
Figure 2.2 presents data from Boston based on over ten thousand individual 
sales of raw land, obtained from Middlesex County deed records. The figure 
shows the average price per square foot expressed in 1967 dollars for each year 
between  1915 and  1988. While no formal analysis of  these data have  been 
accomplished, it is easy to see a dramatic increase precisely during the boom 
years of  1985-87. 
2.4  The Causes of Price Changes 
This section of the paper briefly reviews some of what is known about why 
house prices have behaved the way  they do. This is not an exhaustive review 
of  the existing literature, but rather an  abbreviated discussion of  several re- 
cent issues. 
ing Office, 1989). In 1989 the responsibility for the survey was transferred to the Federal Housing 
Finance Board. 
4. See Case (1986) and Case and Shiller (1990). 40  KarlE. Case 
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Fig. 2.2  Real median land prices in Middlesex County, Massachusetts, 
1915-88, price per square foot (1982 dollars) 
2.4  Demographics 
The most often cited paper on house prices in recent years was written by 
Mankiw and Weil (1989, hereafter M&W). The focus of the M&W paper is 
the baby boom. Demographic data show that there was a jump in the birth rate 
in the United States between  1946 and 1964, resulting in a population bulge 
that has been working its way up the age distribution. The size of the bulge is 
quite dramatic. In 1960,24.0  million people, or 13.3 percent of the population, 
were between the ages of twenty and thirty. By 1980, the number had grown 
to 44.6 million. That bulge began to enter the housing market during the 1970s, 
precisely at the time when house prices were booming. 
To test for the effects of the baby boom, M&W construct a demand variable 
based on the relationship between the quantity of housing consumed and age 
in the 1970 census. After estimating the quantity of housing demanded by each 
age group, the population was “aged” to construct an estimate of demand over 
time as the size of each age cohort changes in predictable ways. The M&W 
measure  of demand declines into the mid- 1960s and then  begins  to climb 
through the 1970s, falling again in the 1980s. 
As a measure of price change, M&W use the residential construction com- 
ponent of the GNP deflator relative to the deflator itself. This ratio is shown in 
figure 2.1, and it moves closely with the M&W measure of demand. Thus, 
when simple correlations are run, they show a powerful relationship. 
The paper in part was designed to test a model suggested by Poterba (1984). 41  Land Prices and  House Prices in the United States 
They use a simple version of the Poterba model to simulate the likely effects 
of the baby boom on prices. The model predicts that, since the age distribution 
of the population in the 1970s is known with certainty in the 1950s and 196Os, 
if demographics had a price effect, it should have been anticipated. Thus, both 
the upturn in the late 1960s and the downturn in the 1980s should have hap- 
pened before the demand growth actually occurred. In essence, they conclude 
that  the  “naive”  model,  without  forward-looking agents,  seems to  predict 
better. 
The conclusion that caused a great deal of concern in the press and among 
housing-market participants, is that “if the historical relation between housing 
demand and prices continues into the future, real housing prices will fall sub- 
stantially over the next two decades” (M&W, 235). 
The response to the M&W article has been dramatic. The National Associa- 
tion of Home Builders, for example, published a twelve-page response, com- 
plete with color photographs, and had a national media conference to refute 
the conclusion. Mankiw was on national television several times, describing 
and defending the study. 
Popular criticism focuses on one basic point. Although an interest rate vari- 
able is included, M&W estimate a model of price formation based essentially 
on a single demand-side variable. Previous work has shown the effect of em- 
ployment growth, tax rates, interest rates, income growth, rent levels, and so 
forth on the demand side, and housing production and costs on the supply 
side.5  Of  critical importance, it is argued, are construction costs. If  prices fall 
to the point where construction is no longer profitable, there will be exit from 
the home building industry, and housing starts will fall. If  starts fall below the 
level of household formation, prices will stabilize. Since household formation 
remains positive over the next few decades, what is really important is the 
relationship between household formation and production. 
One interesting fact that poses a puzzle for the M&W position is the rela- 
tionship between population growth and house price movement in  a cross- 
section of U.S. cities. Table 2.9 presents data on cities for whom the NAR has 
been publishing data since 1982. The simple correlation coefficient between 
1970-80  population growth and nominal median house price change between 
1980 and 1989 is -.506.  The simple correlation coefficient between 1980-87 
population growth and median house price change, again 1980-89,  is -.355. 
A casual glance down the columns reveals that the most rapidly growing 
cities were in the Southwest, an area that experienced a serious economic de- 
cline during the 1980s, while the slowest-growing areas were in the Northeast, 
where the economic environment was strong. In addition, housing production 
was very rapid in the Southwest and relatively slow to respond in the increase 
in demand in the Northeast. Thus, the explanation for the seeming paradox of 
a negative relation between demographics and house price growth in a cross- 
5.  See Case (1986), Case and Shiller (1990),  and others. 42  Karl E. Case 
Table 2.9  Population Growth and House Prices, 1982-89  (%) 
Average Annual 
Change in  Change in  Change in 
Population,  Population,  Median House 
City  1970-80  1980-87  Price, 1982-89 
Phoenix  4.4  3.6  0.7 
Miami  3.4  1.5  2.1 
Orange County, CA  3.1  1.9  8.7 
Albuquerque  2.8  2.0  2.4 
Denver  2.7  1.9  1.8 
Atlanta  2.4  3.0  5.9 
Dallas  2.2  3.3  3.0 
Portland  1.9  0.8  2.7 
Oklahoma City  1.8  1.7  -0.1 
Los Angeles  1.4  2.4  9.0 
Charlotte  1.4  1.6  5.5 
San Francisco  1.2  1.4  10.4 
Minneapolis  0.8  1.2  3.2 
Columbus  0.8  0.8  4.0 
Baltimore  0.5  0.6  6.2 
Kansas City  0.4  1  .o  2.7 
Indianapolis  0.5  0.7  4.9 
Albany  0.3  0.2  11.1 
Chicago  0.2  0.4  5.5 
Toledo  0.2  -0.1  2.4 
Providence  0.2  0.4  14.5 
Boston  -0.3  0.2  11.4 
New York  -0.4  4.0  12.6 
Buffalo  -0.8  -0.8  7.2 
Sources: Median prices, National Association of Realtors, Home Sales (Washington, D.C.: NAR), 
monthly. Population growth, US.  Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of  the  United States, 
1990 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office). 
Note: For Albuquerque, Charlotte. and Toledo, data have been available only since 1983; for Phoe- 
nix and Miami, data have been available only since 1984. 
section requires an analysis of supply and a number of other demand-side vari- 
ables. 
The academic response to M&W is just now beginning to emerge in the 
literature. Hendershott (1990) shows that the M&W equation in fact fits the 
data only from the 1950s and 1960s, and a forecast of the 1970-87  period is 
actually off by a factor of four. In addition, Hendershott estimates an expanded 
model that includes the real after-tax interest rate (entered as both a level and 
change) and real income growth (to capture the impact of increased labor force 
participation). Both interest-rate variables and the income growth variable are 
significant with the correct sign. The income variable indicates an elasticity of 
real prices with respect to real income of .3. 
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percent by the year 2007 if  interest rates remain high relative to their historic 
norms and an increase of 4-7  percent if the real after-tax interest rate drops 
back to its 1947-87  mean. 
2.4.2  The Efficiency of the Housing Market: Inertia in House Prices 
In  Case (1986), the suggestion is made that the upward volatility evident 
since the late 1970s is at least partially the result of speculative behavior. That 
is, the booms recorded above may at least in part be speculative bubbles. 
Three papers of Case and Shiller have brought evidence to bear on the asser- 
tion. First, Case and Shiller (1989) find evidence of positive serial correlation 
in real house prices in four cities: Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, and San Francisco. 
A change in price observed over one year tends to be followed by a change the 
following year in the same direction and between 25 percent and 50 percent as 
large. In  addition, the paper finds evidence of  inertia in a measure of excess 
returns estimated for the same four cities. 
Second, Case and Shiller (1988) present the results of a survey of two thou- 
sand people who bought homes in May  1988 in Orange County (California), 
San Francisco, Boston, and Milwaukee. The results provide strong evidence 
that buyers are influenced heavily by  an investment motive, that they have 
strong expectations of future price increases in housing, and that they perceive 
little risk. Responses to a number of  questions suggest that emotion plays a 
significant role in housing purchase decisions. In addition, buyers do not agree 
about the causes of recent price movements. 
Finally, Case and Shiller (  1990) use time-series cross-section regressions 
to test for the forecastability of prices and excess returns using a number of 
independent variables. They find that the ratio of construction costs to price, 
changes in the adult population, and increases in real per capita income are all 
positively related to house prices and excess returns. The results add weight to 
the argument that the market for single-family homes is inefficient. 
M&W also provide some support for the proposition that the housing market 
is an inefficient asset market when they fail to find a significant relationship 
between the rent price ratio and capital gains. 
2.4.3  Downward Stickiness 
An  important stylized fact about the housing market in the United States 
that has not been well explored in the literature is that house prices are sticky 
downward. That is, when an excess supply occurs, prices do not immediately 
fall to clear the market. Rather, sellers have  reservation prices below which 
they tend not to sell. 
After the first California housing boom ran into a 21 percent prime and a 17 
percent mortgage rate in July 198  1, the number of sales fell sharply. The inven- 
tory of  unsold properties on the market went to all-time high levels. At  the 
same time, new construction dropped to record low levels. Nominal prices 
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Boston and New York/New JerseyIConnecticut have experienced an excess 
supply and low demand since the fall of 1986. Prices stopped rising in nominal 
terms, as a large excess supply built up. But nominal prices stayed virtually flat 
through the spring of  1989, when they began to fall. 
Significant reasons exist to predict such rigidity. First, there is no panic sell- 
ing since the housing market is very different than the stock market. In the 
stock market, people can exit their equity positions quickly and without cost. 
The analog of a Treasury bill in the housing market is moving to a rental unit. 
For  those with considerable equity that would mean paying a large capital 
gains tax (otherwise deferrable) and a 6 percent brokerage fee, as well as put- 
ting up with the aggravation of a move. The transactions costs are very high. 
Many of  the households that responded to the questionnaire in Case and 
Shiller (1988) were recent sellers as well as buyers. When asked what they 
would have done if their house had not sold for the price that they wanted to 
get, only a small fraction said that they would lower the price until the property 
sold. Most indicated that they had a reservation price below which they would 
not go. 
If  the market  is downwardly rigid in  nominal  terms  (at least in  normal 
times), one could argue that the housing market is a “quantity clearing” rather 
than a “price clearing” market. That is, when an excess supply develops either 
from overbuilding or from a drop in demand, nominal prices stick while real 
prices drop slowly. At the same time, new production drops sharply, and sellers 
of existing homes resist downward movement by  not selling. Thus, sales and 
starts would be expected to move with the cycle, while prices would remain 
fairly rigid. 
Figure 2.3 presents a plot of existing house prices and sales, which seem to 
support the notion that the housing market is a quantity clearing market. 
The best evidence of downward stickiness would be persistently high inven- 
tory. Unfortunately, no consistent source of data on inventories exists. While 
multiple-listing-service inventories  might  be  tracked,  properties  are  often 
listed when sellers are actively searching for buyers. Many stop listing after 
their house has been on the market for a long time. This produces a “discour- 
aged seller” effect, similar to the discouraged worker effect, that can lead to a 
decline in formal listings when properties remain overpriced. 
A Boston data service called Market Intelligence has produced a fairly good 
series on inventories, including bank-owned properties, properties under con- 
struction, and informal listings. The data show the number of properties im- 
plicitly or explicitly on the market, divided by the number of sales in the last 
year by  location and type of property. During the fourth quarter of 1990, the 
inventory of unsold single-family homes in the Boston metropolitan area was 
approximately one year,  while the inventory of  unsold  condominiums was 
closer to eighteen months. Many individual properties have been in the inven- 
tory for over two years. While there is no norm for such inventory numbers, 
the consensus among real estate professionals is that less than six months is 45  Land Prices and House Prices in the United States 
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Fig. 2.3  Existing house sales and prices, changes in median price of existing 
single-family  homes (constant dollars) 
Source. National Association of Realtors, Home Sales (Washmgton, D.C.:  NAR), monthly 
healthy. The behavior of inventories across regions is a potentially fruitful area 
for further research. 
It is very important to note that prices "tend" to stick in the downward direc- 
tion, as do wages. But there is certainly plenty of evidence that, when excess 
supplies exist for a long time as the economy worsens, prices begin to fall 
more sharply. This happened in the Southwest as an overbuilt market ran into 
a depression economy, and it has happened to some extent in New England 
and New York, where the evidence suggests substantial nominal declines de- 
pending on the specific area. 
If  house prices in the Northeast and in California were to break sharply 
downward, the banking problems currently being experienced in the United 
States would surely worsen. Consider for example the Boston metropolitan 
area. In the five eastern counties of Massachusetts, approximately 700,000 
households own the housing unit that they occupy. The average nominal ap- 
preciation that occurred during the boom years of 1984-87 was $135,000.  That 
implies an aggregate increase in value of $94.5 billion. Certainly a good part 
of that value was leveraged, as the volume of mortgage credit outstanding in 
New England exploded between 1984 and 1987. The corresponding figure for 
the New York metropolitan area (1983-87) is close to $400 billion. Estimating 
the impact of a 30 percent drop in single-family home equity on bank capital 
is beyond the scope of this paper. Given the magnitude of the assets created 
by the booms, however, there can be no doubt that the effect would be signifi- 
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2.5  Consequences of Regional Differentials: Out-Migration and 
Slow Growth 
There is ample evidence that regional differentials in home prices have in- 
creased during the 1980s. There is little evidence, however, about the effects 
of these differentials. Drier et al. (1988) provide anecdotal evidence that high 
house prices made it difficult for firms to attract workers to the region after 
prices boomed in  1985 and 1986. Clearly, if house prices lead to interregional 
migration, they can have an impact on employment growth. Case (1992) pro- 
vides some evidence that high house prices retarded labor-force growth in New 
England between 1985 and 1987 and contributed to the labor shortage experi- 
enced in the region in 1987 and to a significant increase in wages in the region. 
The most significant evidence of the impact of house prices on migration is 
in a recent paper by  Gabriel, Shack-Marquez, and Wascher (1991). Gabriel 
develops a place-to-place migration model in which household moves depend 
on the relative housing costs and labor market opportunities in the origin and 
destination regions, as well as moving costs and other population characteris- 
tics. Estimates of a logistic model show that house prices are a significant de- 
terminant of regional migration patterns in the United States. 
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